The centenary of the 1916 Rising marks a time of peaceful commemoration, across the island of Ireland. However, several violent dissident republican groups wish to seize it as an opportunity to re-organise in an attempt to bolster and legitimise their sustained paramilitary campaign. This study seeks to provide a greater understanding, of how this paramilitary activity has manifested from 2007 to mid-2015. We do this by assessing target selection, through analysis of the Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) events database. The data suggest that civilian targets are the most regularly attacked. However, when exclusively analysing targets of detonated explosives, the data show that police, security personnel and their infrastructure are more consistently targeted. The target selected can and does have an effect on attack method. These findings can both assist in protecting the potential targets of VDR attacks and contribute to the development of a strong nationalised, and localised, counter VDR narrative.
Davison. 2 The murder, and reactions to it, raised significant concerns about the apparent continued existence of a movement thought inert. This apparent violent return of the 'Provos' to the Northern Irish social and political stage, gave rise to widespread speculation and condemnation in equal measure. However, nothing suggests this is anything more than a settling of old scores. There was no declaration of a resumption of the armed campaign, and no Provisional distancing from the wider political strategy of Sinn Féin (the political wing of the PIRA). In fact, Sinn Féin representatives were quick to condemn the violence. 3 Even though, there continue to be allegations of 'Provisional' involvement in fuel smuggling, intimidation and wider criminality 4 this, it appears, does not herald a permanent return to the paramilitary stage, and instead is simply characterized by the involvement of former figures in that movement, sometimes working together in small groups.
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Meanwhile, as the political and media focus rested firmly on allegations of the Provisionals' return, the more persistent threat to Northern Irish security of violent dissident republicanism 6 (VDR) once again reared its ugly head. On the same day as the murder of McGuigan, a VDR bomb exploded on the Skeoge Road in Derry. Two days later, another, perhaps more significant, bomb exploded this time inside Palace Barracks, the Northern Irish base of both MI5 and The Royal Scots Borderers. The bomb was hidden inside a parcel in a Royal Mail postal van. It is believed that this was detonated remotely. While neither explosion inflicted any injuries or fatalities, both events illustrated the continuing intent of the VDR groupings to perpetuate an armed campaign that has been sporadically on-going since 1994. These two attacks
should not be considered as wholly representative of VDR tactics. However, they illustrate the intention of the groups, to simultaneously target the security services of the state while also aiming to disrupt the normalisation of Northern Irish life, through their attacks on civilian targets across the country. The main purpose of this article is to analyse how this modern day VDR activity has evolved; and in particular, to assess who and what have been the victims and targets of that violence.
The Modern Wave of VDR Activity
For many, the history of VDR activity is defined by the Omagh bombing, the Real punishment attacks and murders of those they deem to be criminals (e.g. alleged drug dealers).
We believe that the violence in present-day Northern Ireland is part of a modern wave of VDR activity, which dates back to January 2007. It was then that the Ard Fheis (the annual party conference) of Sinn Féin made the historical decision to support the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). 8 This vote provided the cornerstone for sustained peace in the country. For generations, republican distrust in, and dismissal of, the police had played a significant role in holding back the complete normalisation of Northern Irish society. Prior to their full acceptance and support of the PSNI, Sinn
Féin had historically told their supporters not to report any crimes or misdemeanours to the police, either the PSNI or their predecessors in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). 9 This was due to the stated Republican belief that this was a British police force, whose very existence promoted the continued partition of Ireland. Historically for Irish Republican paramilitaries the PSNI, and the RUC, represented an 'occupying', British and 'political' police force. For the Irish republicans, the police did not represent their community. The RUC especially, was framed as a predominantly Protestant and unionist sympathising police force, whose job it was to maintain the existence of partition. 
Rebranding of Dissidence
The history of Irish Republicanism has for many been defined by infighting, factionalism and splits. 24 However, in July 2012 the RIRA and RAAD came together, alongside other previously independent dissidents, in a merger. 29 It is feared that the dissidents will seek to maintain, and potentially expand, the Northern Irish campaign while concurrently targeting high profile sites in Britain.
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Target Selection
As has been illustrated already, there are a range of people and places targeted by VDR groups. But the question remains, how and why do they select these targets?
Historically our understanding of terrorist targeting has been ideologically centred, particularly up to and including the end of the Cold War. The belief has been that the ideology of the terrorist will provide the parameters under which a specific target can be selected, and the prism through which they view the world. 31 Alongside the primacy of ideology, it has been believed that the target selection is also influenced by the internal organisational dynamics, personalities and a variety of other internal and external factors. 32 This focus on ideologically and organisationally specific factors has at times resulted in a downplaying of the influence that the nature of the targets themselves can have in the selection process. targets are more susceptible to terrorist attacks when they are exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, near and easy. In the application of their model it has been stipulated that the proximity, or nearness, to the target is likely to be the most important in target selection. 34 Clarke and Newman are not alone in applying SCP to terrorism. In their analysis of the target-selection by eco-terrorists, Gruenewald and colleagues 35 applied SCP and found that the proximity of the targets also played a significant role. They found that local targets were more likely to be attacked than the national symbols. This fits within their finding that the ecoterrorists, in their research, were more likely to choose 'easy' and unprotected targets.
This localised target selection is also underpinned by the organisational outlook and ideology. There is a noted contrast, which shows that these groups differ from transnational terrorist organisations that target symbols of national and international importance, as a result of their internationally focused aims and ideology. groups, it also needs to be more readily shown within groups as well.
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The Present Study
The examination of VDR target selection is carried out here by developing on from where our previous analysis left off. In a 2011 publication, we analysed VDR activity from 1997 to 2010. 39 Here we assess event data in relation to all violent VDR activity, 40 Each VDR event is coded across 32 variables. 42 For it to be included in the database, each event must be verified by at least two independent sources of information. As well as adding new information to the database, there are also regular audits on existing data entries to verify the validity of the coded data. Complementing the events database there is also a VDR personnel database. In this section, information relating to individuals who have been convicted and/or charged of VDR related offences are coded across a total of 62 variables. However, the present article is only relating to analysis of the events based data. 43 Across the majority of analysis of VDR activity the assessment of violence is categorised by group. 44 However, for the purpose of this article we do not offer such a cross-group comparison. The reason for this is that in recent years much of the VDR activity has gone unclaimed, by any group. This is an observation that dates back to previous analysis of the VDR database, 45 and is still apparent in the latest iteration.
This is not a characteristic unique to VDR groups. It has been witnessed across groups and ideologies. Internationally, over half of all terrorist attacks are not credibly claimed. 46 There is a range of possible reasons for leaving attacks unclaimed.
However, the rationale for this in relation to VDR attacks requires analysis, which is outside the scope of the present paper.
In spite of a lack of a cross-group comparison, we account for the heterogeneity of VDR activity. We examine general event data, to assess whether there are any broad patterns apparent, before exploring the data in more detail. We firstly analyse data on victims and targets of detonated explosives and shootings, before examining fatality data from 2007 to mid-2015. In doing so we assess who precisely the victims were, before analysing how they were killed. Therefore, five core research questions are This deterioration in overall VDR activity is not just a result of internal VDR decision-making, or poor engineering. It is necessary to also recognise the successes of the counter-VDR campaign, which has been led by the PSNI in collaboration with
An Garda Síochána (police of the Republic of Ireland) and the intelligence services.
However, while the security services have demonstrated their ability to disrupt violent activity, through arrests and counter-VDR activity, there is also an acknowledgement on both sides of the border that the VDR threat has not necessarily gone away. In
October 2015 the assistant chief constable of the PSNI Will Kerr acknowledged as much by stating that an attack was 'highly likely' in Northern Ireland, 49 an assertion that is supported by the maintenance of the threat of 'Northern Ireland related terrorism in Northern Ireland' at a severe level ever since September 24 th 2010. 50 As
the later sections will demonstrate, when there is deterioration in the frequency of overall violent activity this must not lead to complacency in the belief that the threat has gone away. A drop in frequency is not necessarily equivalent to a drop in threat.
This may merely mean an organisational, strategic or tactical change resulting in a change of focus and frequency of violence.
Targets/Victims of VDR Activity
What follows is an analysis of the victims and targets of VDR violence. The analysis Similarly with respect to punishment attacks the VDR groups target many of the people because the victims are believed to be criminals, anti-social influences in the community or other societal threats. However, the groups do not always publicly verify the rationale behind the choice of target for punishment beating. Therefore in these cases if the individual targeted does not have any criminal record, or any other discerning characteristic to justify their targeting, they were also coded as being 'civilian.' Even with this caveat in place it is clear that those who are most frequently in danger of VDR attacks are not the security forces, prison officers, politicians or criminals. Similar to the victims of Provisional IRA violence, 51 it is the civilian population that is most frequently put at risk due to VDR activity. *=This includes both current and retired/former police officers **=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups This was brought about due to the growing number of teenagers reporting to accident and emergency departments of hospitals, due to adverse reactions caused by consuming substances bought in the shops. As a result in June 2010 the Irish government successfully banned these 'new psychoactive substances,' and resultantly brought about the end of the vast majority of the stores. 52 Against a backdrop of moral panic, the Real IRA and other VDR groups started to violently target the owners and premises of these stores. This included, amongst a number of other attacks, the Real IRA claiming responsibility for throwing a grenade into the home of Dublin-based 'head-shop' owner, Jim Bellamy, in mid-2010. 53 Many understandably report these attacks as a reaction, to the competition posed by the 'head-shops' to the dissident involvement in illegal drug dealing. 54 However, it could similarly be interpreted as an attempt from the VDR groups to bolster support, within the communities they claim to represent. This may explain why a significant proportion of this targeting took place in and close to the republican areas of Derry city. 55 In a similar vein as their targeting of drug dealers, the VDR groups have justified these attacks as their attempts to protect the community from the dangers posed by these shops. 56 The example of these attacks demonstrates that an individual attack can, and often does, have a dual purpose. These attacks can equally be interpreted as attempts to drive out the competition to their drug-based criminality, and contrastingly could be an attempt to gain greater trust from within the communities.
Detonated Explosives
who and what the VDR groups are targeting, it is only when we focus on specific forms of violence that we can achieve a more in-depth understanding of the intentions of the groups. When the data were analysed to focus solely on the victims and targets of detonated explosives the frequency levels change significantly. As can be seen when comparing Tables 1 and 2 *=This includes both current and retired/former police officers **=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups higher. However, without a subsequent statement of intent and purpose after each attack it is impossible to reliably code for intent in relation to all activity.
Shootings
The VDR groups, alongside their targeting of the security services and institutions of the state, have also persisted in targeting those they classify as criminal actors. This has mainly included local drug dealers, from the republican and nationalist areas of Northern Ireland. However, as can be seen from the data in Table 2 these criminals are not generally targeted using explosive devices. There are of course exceptions to this, as can be seen with the utility of pipe bombs by RAAD in 2010 to target people they claimed to be drug dealers. 57 These attacks account for 9.76% of all detonated explosives in 2010. However, it is more common for perceived criminals to be targeted by shootings. Table 3 shows that 17.13% of all shootings target individuals who are known to be, or perceived to be, criminals. This is in comparison to a 3.31%
targeting with detonated explosives. The true figure of criminal and anti-social targeting will be supplemented from the 59.99% targeting of civilian, many of whom may be perceived to be criminals or anti-social entities by the violent dissidents.
However, this is not readily communicated through a claim of responsibility or explanation of attack. Resultantly they have been coded as being 'civilian.'
In contrast to the 40.5% of detonated explosives that target police and intelligence personnel and facilities, only 15.42% of all shootings have been directed at them.
However, while the frequency of the act is low the 2009 murders of Constable
Stephen Carroll and British soldiers Mark Quinsey and Patrick Azimkar have demonstrated the potential, and intended, lethality of some of these attacks.
VDR Fatalities
The VDR groups promote themselves as a paramilitaries fighting against the forces of the British state. However, this is not abundantly apparent, when their shooting and *=This includes both current and retired/former police officers **=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups The perception of power and control is clearly important to the VDR groups. For them to be able to survive, a pre-requisite to achieving any degree of 'success', 58 they believe that they must first of all gain the support from, and control of, their own communities. There are two core reasons as to why fellow VDR actors are targeted.
They are perceived to be either an internal or an external threat. These threats may be towards the leadership, individual members or the organisation as a whole. In a postsplit environment the perception of enemy often changes. Those who were once regarded as comrades and allies are now perceived to be an organisational and strategic threat. This not only accounts for the VDR actors being targeted but also for the 1.39% of all VDR activity that was directed towards republican or nationalist politicians. *=This includes known criminals as well as those who were claimed to be criminals by the VDR groups 
Target Decision-Making: Bombings versus Shootings
In assessing these data we must question why there is such a difference between the targets of shootings and detonated explosives? The terrorist actor must decide, and However, they are not easy. Therefore, it is proposed that these factors lead the decision-makers to more regularly decide that an explosive device is the best tactic to use, when targeting police. A 'successful' bomb can send a message both to the police and to internal members that the organisation has the intent and capability to threaten the police.
One of the most important factors for the perpetrators to consider is the possibility of arrest. The contrast here is clear, a shooter needs to be in closer proximity to his or her target than someone who plants a bomb. This therefore provides greater possibility of a shooter being arrested at the scene of a crime. They will always need to be there, at the time of attack. In contrast the person who plants the bomb will not always be in the proximity at the point of detonation. They may not even be within the same town, county or country. The targeting of police officers and facilities requires police officers to be present at the point of attack. This resultantly brings with it a higher risk of arrest.
Reducing the possibility of detection or arrest may in turn be an integral part of the decision-making process, which has led to the proliferation of the utility of both letter and proxy bombs in the recent past. Both of these have seen a recent return to the streets of Northern Ireland. As can be seen from data presented in Table 5 The rationalisation as to why detonated explosives more readily target the security forces provides us with a generalizable understanding of the decision-making process.
However, when we bring the factors of timing and organisational change into consideration this can periodically alter the process. As has already been seen the relaunch of the VDR campaign saw a steady rise in activity from 2007 to 2010. We also witnessed a minor peak in activity in the aftermath of the development of the 'The IRA/New IRA.' It is important that we don't just look at the frequency of events but also the nature and intent of the attacks.
In The targeting of criminals provides a reduced risk of arrest. Due to the very nature of the chosen targets, they are less inclined to report the crime due to the rationale for their targeting. By reporting to the police that you were a victim of such an attack, one is not only identifying themselves as a perceived criminal but they are also placing themselves, their family and affiliates at risk of future attacks. Overall this sends an intended message of local power and control. This is in contrast to their message when targeting the security and symbols of the state. In those actions they are portraying themselves as the 'put-upon' minority intent on gaining national power.
Conclusions
The centenary of the 1916 Rising will represent a time of celebration for the Irish people. It provides an opportunity to reflect, on the evolution of the country and the island as a whole. However, while the majority will be utilising this centenary to This is further compounded with the terrorists' attempts to forcefully acquire power and control, within republican areas of Belfast and Derry, through their at times lethal form of vigilante 'justice,' against those they have personally defined as 'criminals.'
What our analysis has aimed to show are the results of the VDR decision-making process, not just in relation to target selection but also in the choice of method of attack. The study has shown that there are contrasting methods used, dependent on the victim or target selected. Even though the majority of general VDR attacks are directed against civilian targets, distantly followed by the police and intelligence services, when we focus purely on detonated explosives the result is quite different.
When utilising this method of attack security related targets are more likely to be the focus. However, when the concentration is on shootings, civilian and criminal targets are both more likely than the security services to be the intended victim.
Central to this is the disparity of the aims in targeting both sets of victims. The targeting of the security services forms part of the national organisational strategy of the groups. The intent of this target selection is to provide both internal members and external audiences with the impression that the groups are posing a threat to the security apparatus of an 'occupying regime.' However, the targeting of civilians and perceived criminals derives from the local organisational strategies of achieving power and control in the Republican areas of Northern Ireland. The chosen modus operandi to attack these targets reflects the rationale behind the target selection, but also the opportunities provided by the targets themselves. With this considered it is believed that the SCP approach, as well as an ideology centric view, working in parallel can assist in our understanding of the target selection.
The understanding gained from this analysis, can provide the information necessary for greater preparedness to withstand potential future attacks. However, the information should also be utilised by those engaging in any form of counter-narrative against the VDR groups. These groups are continuously attempting to portray themselves as victims, and their 'struggle' as legitimate. In doing so they attempt to depict the PSNI and security services as being central to an oppressive regime. It is a continuous strategy to try and assign blame to the police for anyone who may be a casualty of their attacks. To their supporters they wish to lay blame at the door of the police tactics, claiming that they, the police, continuously put the civilians in harm's way in order to protect themselves. This is an attempt to simultaneously gain support for their legitimacy and discourage any trust in the police. Perhaps, the most effective way of countering this message is through the demonstration of data, which show that it is the VDR groups, rather than the police, who are putting civilians in harm's way. This is both through the direct targeting of civilians with their attacks and the forced use of civilians to deliver their bombs to the intended target.
For this wider analysis to have further significance for those wishing to counter the VDR threat, it is important that any devised strategy must incorporate appropriately tailored national and local strategies. There needs to be an appreciation of the diversity of tactics, targets and rationale. Further analysis is therefore required to assess the influence of regional factors on the choice of victims, targets and methods.
This regional appreciation, coupled with the analysis presented here can and will
